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NOTES 
GIVE ME LIBERTI OR GIVE ME SILENCE: TAKING A 
STAND ON FIFTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS FOR 
COURT-ORDERED THERAPY PROGRAMS 
INTRODUCTION 
[T] he Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion ... can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, admin-
istrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects 
against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be 
used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that 
might be so used. 1 
Probation is frequently conditioned on the convicted criminal's 
satisfactory completion of a rehabilitative therapy program.2 A pri-
mary purpose of the criminal justice system is to protect the public by 
discouraging recidivism in past offenders. 3 In theory, permanent in-
carceration best serves this purpose, because a person in jail cannot 
commit another crime.4 In the last century, however, the prison pop-
1 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (footnotes omitted). 
2 See Ann A. Holmes, Note, Alternative Sentencing in Alabama, 16 LAw & PsvcHOL. REv. 
217, 221-22 (1992). Many courts use "intensive supervised probation," which involves in-
creased observation and may be coupled with psychological counseling. See id.; see also Gail 
Jones, The Use and Effectiveness of the Probation Order with a Condition for Psychiatric Treatment 
in North Wales, 20 CAMBIUAN L. REv. 63 (1989) (noting that most commentators are enthusi-
astic about the use of court-ordered therapy programs). 
This Note assumes that such therapy programs successfully curb recidivism. See CoM-
MITI'EE ON Gov'T PoLICY, GAP REPORT No. 137, FoRCED INTO TREATMENT: THE RoLE OF 
CoERCION IN CLINICAL PRACTICE (1994) (noting the success of court-ordered therapy in a 
number of contexts, including for sex offenders); Amicus Brief of American Professional 
Society on the Abuse of Children Supporting Neither Party at 12, State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 
979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 444 (1992) (No. 91-
687) [hereinafter APSAC Brief] (noting the significant difference in recidivism rates for 
offenders who complete therapy versus those who do not participate); see also W.L. Mar-
shall & H.E. Barbaree, Outcome of Comprehensive Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment Programs, in 
HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL AssAULT: ISSUES, THEORIES, AND TRE!\.TMENT OF THE OFFENDER 363, 
379 (W.L. Marshall eta!. eds., 1990) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL AsSAULT] ("Outpa-
tient treatment of sex offenders by cognitive-behavioral procedures ... seems to be effec-
tive."). But see Lita Furby eta!., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL BuLL 3, 27 
(1989) (noting the difficulty of drawing conclusions from current studies). 
3 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 10 (2d ed. 
1986) (discussing criminal law's goal of preventing harm to society). 
4 This reasoning ignores the prevalence of crime in prison. See Hudson v. Palmer, 
468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (giving statistics on crime in prison). 
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ulation in the United States has increased dramatically.5 Overcrowd-
ing in jails has forced law enforcement officials to seek alternatives to 
incarceration.6 Suspended sentences and probation provide such al-
ternatives, and are often used for nondangerous offenders. 7 Proba-
tion, however, does not provide the same certainty of nonrecidivism as 
incarceration does;8 therefore, the increased use of probation has cor-
responded with an increase in court-ordered therapy.9 In 1978, the 
Supreme Court recognized that "[a]pproximately a century ago, are-
form movement assert[ed] that the purpose of"incarceration, and 
therefore the guiding consideration in sentencing, should be rehabili-
tation of the offender."10 This emphasis on rehabilitationii has had 
enormous implications for the mental health profession. The most 
i~portant consequence has been the growth and diversification of 
therapy programs ranging from substance abuse counseling to family 
group therapy to sex offender treatment programs.12 
5 See Holmes, supra note 2, at 217 (" [S]tate and federal prison populations have more 
than tripled" in the past couple of decades.) See generally Benjamin Frank, The American 
Prison: The End of an Era, 43 FED. PROBATION 3 (1979) (arguing that due to the population 
increase, incarceration can no longer be the primary form of punishment)." 
6 See Holmes, supra note 2, at 221-28; see also STEVEN R. SMITH & RoBERT G. MEYER; 
LAw, BEHAVIOR, AND MENTAL HEALTH: POLICY AND PRACTICE 445-48 (1987.) (listing alterna-
tives to incarceration). 
7 See Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943); ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAw 
OF SENTENCING 52 (1978); Holmes, supra note 2, at 219. 
8 See Holmes, supra note 2, at 221; see also Furby et al., supra note 2, at 3-4 (noting that 
in states which emphasize rehabilitation "the prevailing view is that simple incarceration is 
not a sufficient deterrent for sex offenders." However, because "the ovenvhelming major-
ity of apprehended sex offenders are not incarcerated or institutionalized at all .... proba-
tion with mandated treatment ... is the most common disposition."). 
9 See Furby et al., supra note 2, at 4 ("In response to the increa5ing demand for sex 
offender treatment, there has been a proliferation of both public and private outpatient 
programs."). 
10 United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978); see Carol A. Veneziano, Prison 
Inmates and Consent to Treatment: Problems and Issues, 10 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 129, 130 
(1986). See generally LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 3, at 23-26 (discussing different justifica-
tions for punishment and the current emphasis on rehabilitation). 
11 In very recent years there has been a decline in the push toward rehabilitation as 
the primary goal of the criminal justice system. This decline is due to the apparent lack of 
results from rehabilitative programs and the high cost of administering therapy programs. 
See, e.g., SMITH & MEYER, supra note 6, at 424-25;Justin Brooks, Addressing Recidivism: Legal 
Education in Correctional Settings, 44 RuTGERS L. REv. 699, 702 n.6 (1992) (theorizing that 
this shift has been prompted by the increase in drug-related crimes); see also Michael Vi-
tiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TuL. L. REv. 1011 (1991) (criticizing the recent rejec-
tion of the rehabilitative model of punishment). This Note assumes that, regardless of this 
shift, rehabilitation still plays a significant role in sentencing. 
12 See generally HARoLD J. VETTER & LEONARD TERRITO, CRIME AND JusTICE IN AMERICA 
475-81 (1984) (discussing addiction treatment and community correctional centers); Stan-
ley L. Brodsky & Donald]. West, Life-Skills Treatment of Sex Offenders, 6 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 
97 (1981) (comparing different forms of treatment for sexual offenders). The sex of-
fender programs referred to in this Note do not treat violent sex crimes such as rape. 
The expansion of these programs has resulted in a proliferation of new forms of treat-
ment, often focusing less on a "cure" than on controlling symptoms. There is a growing 
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The dramatic expansion of therapeutic sentencing alternatives 
has disturbing implications for the Fifth Amendment rights of con-
victed offenders, because cooperation of the patient is a prerequisite 
to successful therapy.l 3 Sex offenders, alcoholics, batterers and child 
abusers often deny both the commission of an offense and the inap-
propriateness of their actions.14 The first step toward rehabilitation, 
however, is to admit that there is a problem. In criminal law, this 
translates into an admission of guilt, raising the question of whether 
the requirement of most therapy programs that a defendant accept 
responsibility for his actions15 violates the Fifth Amendment protec-
tion against self-incrimination.16 
To answer this question this Note first discusses a Montana case, 
State v. Imlay, 17 which highlights one of the conflicts that arises be-
tween the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and 
the need of the criminal justice system for effective rehabilitation. 
Part II identifies the requirements of a basic Fifth Amendment claim. 
Part III examines two examples of Fifth A.mendment balancing prior 
to conviction. Additionally, it discusses various alternatives to the bal-
ancing approach which have been taken in termination of parental 
rights cases by courts seeking to avoid the conflict between court-or-
dered therapy and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. Part IV explores the application of the Fifth Amendment in 
the post sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding. This note pro-
poses that a state's legitimate interest in compelling testimony for rea-
sons other than amassing evidence for a criminal prosecution should 
. be balanced against the defendant's interest in asserting the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. After a verdict of guilty, this balancing may 
belief among mental health professionals that sexual dysfunction such as child molestation 
cannot be cured. Rather, the perpetrators can be taught to recognize signs of the problem 
and control their impulses. The present psychological approach uses cognitive behavioral 
therapy to prevent recidivism. See APSAC Brief, supra note 2, at 10-11; see also William D. 
Pithers, Relapse Prevention with Sexual Aggressors, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL AssAULT, supra 
note 2, at 343, 346 (discussing self-management skills of sex offenders as an alternative goal 
of therapy); William D. Murphy, Assessment and Modification of Cognitive Distortions in Sex 
Offenders, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL AssAULT, supra note 2, at 331 (describing self-modifica-
tion training). 
13 See, e.g., Marshall & Barbaree, supra note 2, at 374 (noting that men who refused to 
participate in treatment because of a failure to admit guilt "recidivated at a rate that was, if 
anything, slightly higher than the untreated admitters"). 
14 See APSAC Briet, mpra note 2, at 13; Jeffrey A. Klotz et al., Cognitive Restructuring 
Through Law: A Therapeutic jurisprudence Approach to Sex Offenders and the Plea Process, 15 U. 
PUGET SoUND L. REv. 579, 581 nn.7-9 (1992). 
15 This Note uses the phrase "acceptance of responsibility" interchangeably with "ad-
mission of guilt." 
16 The Fifth Amendment states in relevant part: "No person shall ... be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
17 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cerl. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 
444 (1992). 
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come out in favor of lessening the extent of the constitutional protec-
tion with respect to particular inquiries. Finally, this Note analyzes the 
requirements of rehabilitation schemes in the context of two recent 
Supreme Court cases which show that the elements needed to trigger 
a Fifth Amendment claim may be present in cases where the protec-
tion is not allowed to operate.18 In such situations the government's 
interest in imposing a requirement of therapy outweighs a defend-
ant's interest in the Fifth Amendment protections. 
I 
THE CONFLICT IDENTIFIED 
In State v. Imlay, 19 the District Court of Cascade County found the 
defendant guilty of sexually abusing a minor and sentenced him to 
five years in jai1.20 The judge imposed a suspended sentence, condi-
tioning Imlay's probation on the satisfactory completion of a therapy 
program for sex offenders. 21 The therapy program required Imlay to 
accept responsibility for his actions. When Imlay asserted his inno-
cence, as he had throughout the trial, the therapist refused to pursue 
treatment.22 The state prosecutor's office then petitioned for revoca-
tion of the suspended sentence on the ground that Imlay had violated 
the t.erms of his probation.23 
The district court revoked Imlay's probation and reinstated the 
original five year sentence.24 During the hearing, the court gathered 
evidence from the directors of two sexual offender treatment pro-
grams.25 It found that no outpatient therapy program would accept a 
person who refused to admit committing a sexual assault. Moreover, 
the Montana State Prison ran the only available inpatient program.26 
The court determined that a repeat offense was improbable, but felt 
constrained by the jury's guilty verdict and thus decided to revoke Im-
lay's probation. 27 
18 This Note draws a distinction between the availability of the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination and its applicability. Thus, there are some situations that 
meet the requisite criteria for triggering the privilege, but, because the balance of interests 
comes out in the government's favor, the constitutional protection is limited. 
19 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, ll3 S. Ct. 
444 (1992). 
20 !d. at 980. 
21 !d. at 981. 
22 !d. 
23 Joint Appendix at 24, State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, ll2 S. 
Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, ll3 S. Ct. 444 (1992) [hereinafter Joint Appendix]. 
24 !d. at 36. 
25 !d. at 34-35. 
26 !d. at 35. 
27 !d. at 36. 
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The Montana Supreme Court vacated the sentence and re-
manded the case to the district court, holding that the Fifth Amend-
ment prohibits increasing a defendant's sentence for his refusal to 
confess his guilt.28 The State of Montana, joined by seventeen other 
states, petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari on the ground that 
the Fifth Amendment was not applicable because there was no further 
threat of prosecution. 29 In response, Imlay claimed that he feared a 
criminal prosecution for perjury and that the district court had penal-
ized him for exercising his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate 
himself. 30 This Note argues that the decision of the Montana 
Supreme Court is erroneous. Although the court correctly held that 
Fifth Amendment protections are available in the probationary con-
text, it erred in assessing the specific application of those protections. 
II 
REQUIREMENTS FOR A FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIM 
The Fifth Amendment has its origins in the English common 
law,31 from which it was later incorporated into the American Bill of 
Rights. The framers, "[w]hile deeply committed to perpetuating a sys-
tem that minimized the possibilities of convicting the innocent, ... 
were not less concerned about the humanity that the fundamental law 
28 Imlay, 813 P.2d at 985. On remand, the district court resentenced Imlay to five 
years in prison, noting that, had it known of Imlay's unacceptability into a therapy pro-
gram, it would not have allowed a suspended sentence in the first place. Joint Appendix, 
supra note 23, at 41. 
29 See Amicus Brief Submitted by the State of Vermont on Behalf of the States of 
Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah and Virginia in 
Support of Petitioner, Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert. 
dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 444 (1992) (No. 91-687) [hereinafter Brief of States in Support of 
Petitioner]. The American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children filed a brief sup-
porting neither party. APSAC Brief, supra note 2. Additionally, the United States Depart-
ment of Justice flied a brief on behalf of the petitioner. 
30 Brief for Respondent, at 9-10 Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. 
Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 444 (1992). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
heard oral arguments in the case. However, it later concluded that any opinion it would 
render would be merely advisory and that the petition should have been dismissed. Mon-
tana v. Imlay, 113 S. Ct. 444 (1992) (dismissal of certiorari because improvidently granted). 
Mr. Imlay would either be released on parole, or serve his complete sentence regardless of 
the decision of the United States Supreme Court; thus a ruling would not have a substan-
tive impact on the rights of either party. See id. at 444-45 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice 
White dissented from the decision, claiming that the importance of the issue, and the 
conflict among the lower courts, mandated a consideration of the case. Id. at 445 (White, 
J., dissenting). 
31 See genlffally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 368 (1968); WAYNE R. LAFAVE &jEROLD H. IsRAEL, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1992). At English common law, there was an oath ex officio stating 
"nemo teneture seipsum prodm" (no man is bound to produce himself). When the Bill of 
Rights incorporated the maxim, it varied the language to cover any forced self-incrimina-
tion. See id. at § 8.14. 
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should show even to the offender."32 Thus, the protections found in 
the Fifth Amendment are meant to apply to the guilty and the 
innocent. 
Several concerns guide the application of the Fifth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 33 listed a 
number of these considerations: 
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel 
trilemma of self-accusation, peijury or contempt; our preference for 
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal jus-
tice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by 
inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play ... ; our 
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the 
right of each individual [to privacy] ... ; our distrust of self-depreca-
tory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while some-
times "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the 
innocent. "34 
This does not mean, however, that the Fifth Amendment is an abso-
lute right. The courts have never interpreted the amendment to pre-
vent the use of nontestimonial incriminating evidence or voluntary 
statements.35 Once a court establishes that the Fifth Amendment is 
implicated in a particular situation, the court must still determine the 
extent of its protection. This Note proposes that such a determina-
tion should take into account the various policies behind the amend-
ment and balance the individual's interest against the government's.36 
In some situations, such as the preconviction context, the balance wi1l 
strongly favor applying the full protection afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment.37 After a verdict of guilty, however, full protection may 
32 
33 
LEVY, supra note 31, at 432. 
378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
34 !d. at 55 (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)) (footnotes 
omitted). The first concern observes the importance of not presenting a defendant with an 
impossible choice; the second reflects the type of system our society favors; the third rec-
ognizes the possible abuses of police power; the fourth concern notices that the unequal 
balance of power in favor of the government would lead many defendants to plead guilty 
in order to avoid harsh penalties (Plea bargaining, although it raises these same concerns, 
is now allowed in recognition of its usefulness in the settlement of cases without trial. 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)); the fifth recognizes an individual's right to 
privacy; the sixth focuses on the fear of false guilty pleas; and the seventh is an acknowledg-
ment that our society views "the determination of guilt or innocence by just procedures" to 
be "more important than punishing the guilty." LEw, supra note 31, at 432. 
35 See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1985). 
36 See discussion infra part IV. 
37 A court may be able to balance in the presentencing context; however, the individ-
ual's interest in most cases will be so strong as to override the government's interest. 
Although the analysis in this Note is applicable to the presentencing situation, there are 
different considerations at various stages in the trial process. Accordingly, this Note con-
centrates on the application of a balancing test to the postsentencing phase of a criminal 
trial. 
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not apply, and the court can weigh the scope of the Amendment 
against society's interest in a workable criminal justice system.38 
A. Incrimination 
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination has two 
parts.39 First, it guarantees every person the right to remain silent 
when faced with a reasonable fear of incrimination in a later criminal 
proceeding. Second, it protects against the use of statements that are 
the result of governmental coercion. This section focuses on the first 
part of the privilege against self-incrimination. The following section 
addresses the exclusion of coerced testimony. 
1. Real Fear of Incrimination 
For the privilege against self-incrimination to attach, the risk of 
future incrimination must not merely present " 'imaginary and insub-
stantial' hazards of incrimination," but "rather ... 'real and apprecia-
ble' risks."40 If the risk is too speculative, the Fifth Amendment's 
protections do not apply. 41 The requirement that the fear not be im-
aginary focuses on the risk of incrimination, not prosecution. Prosecu-
tion need only be possible; it does not actually have to happen, nor 
does it have to result in a conviction.42 Furthermore, the amendment 
"does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. "43 Thus, if the fear of 
incrimination is real but minor, the amendment's protections apply. 
Although the right against self-incrimination applies to defend-
ants in all proceedings, the resulting incrimination must relate to a 
criminal charge. Because a probation revocation hearing is not a 
criminal proceeding, the Fifth Amendment does not protect against 
the use of coerced statements at such hearings, nor is a person privi-
leged to remain silent when her only fear is revocation of probation. 44 
38 See discussion infra part IV. 
39 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
40 Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 98 (1969) (deciding that the risk presented by 
the registration requirement for narcotics dealers was not substantial because it was un-
likely that illegal sales would be recorded). 
41 Id. at 98. 
42 Minor's fear was unreasonable because the fear of incrimination was not realistic. 
Minor, 396 U.S. at 93. If the incriminating statements were likely to be recorded, the Fifth 
Amendment would apply whether or not the government tended to prosecute the offense. 
This distinction becomes important later in the context of Imlay--even though the govern-
ment may not often bring prosecutions for perjury based upon evidence acquired during 
therapy, the fear of incrimination is still real and substantial. See infra part IV.B.2. 
43 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). 
44 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). In Gagnon, the defendant was 
arrested for burglary while on probation. His probation was revoked without a hearing. 
The Court held that, although Mr. Scarpelli was entitled to a hearing under the same 
conditions as required for the revocation of parole in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
(1972), such a hearing is not considered a criminal proceeding. The Court emphasized 
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A probationer, nevertheless, may fear further criminal prosecution for 
the activities resulting in the revocation of probation. Consequently, 
the Supreme Court has held that: 
[t]he Amendment not only protects the individual against being in-
voluntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecu-
tion but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to 
him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, 
· where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal 
proceedings. 45 
The following analysis focuses on the postsentencing context and 
addresses two concerns: the right to remain silent in the face of ques-
tions related to the original criminal charge, and questions related to 
a separate criminal charge. 
a. Fear of incrimination related to the original criminal prosecution 
Questions put to a postconviction, pre-appeal defendant about 
the crime for which she was convicted raise FifLh A_mendment con-
cerns. The Double Jeopardy Clause46 prohibits a second trial for a 
single crime, so there is no fear of another, identical criminal prosecu-
tion.47 The convicted defendant, however, may still seek postconvic-
tion relief and therefore fear incrimination after the conclusion of the 
initial trial. 48 In United States v. DiFrancesco49 the Supreme Court noted 
that a jury verdict of not guilty is final, although the pronouncement of 
a sentence is not.50 A conviction is final when the time for appeal has 
elapsed and a petition for certiorari either has been denied or no 
longer can be brought on the issue.51 Therefore, when tl1e questions 
relate to the original criminal prosecution, a criminal whose convic-
tion is deemed final is not privileged to remain silent.52 
the "informal nature of the proceedings and the absence of technical rules of procedure 
or evidence." Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786-87. Additionally, the hearing board is not in the role 
of a judge focusing on factlinding and punishment, but is concerned instead with the 
rehabilitative needs of the offender. !d. at 787-88. 
45 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 
46 U.S. CoNST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... "). 
47 See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989) (holding that a later 
civil proceeding can violate the clause if the judgment serves as a penalty rather than mere 
restitution). 
48 Such relief may take the form of a direct appeal, a motion for a second trial based 
upon new evidence, or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
49 449 U.S. 117 (1980). 
50 !d. at 132. 
51 Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987) (citing United States v.Johnson, 
457 U.S. 537, 542 n.8 (1982)). 
52 If the questions would incriminate the defendant in another charge, then he would 
be privileged to remain silent. Alternatively, if the inquiries focus only on actions for 
which he has already been tried, there would be no possibility of further prosecution, and 
thus no fear of incrimination. 
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Even before the convicted criminal has exhausted all avenues of 
appeal, the state can impose a sentence. 53 At this point it is the 
defendant who must weigh the risks and benefits of remaining si-
lent-the burden switches to him to show his innocence.54 The Fifth 
Amendment allows a defendant to remain silent before a conviction is 
final, but it does not allow a person to escape a valid sentence. Thus, 
a convicted criminal may not avoid a particular sentence by maintain-
ing his innocence and claiming that the protection afforded by the 
Fifth Amendment excuses his lack of proof.55 This does not mean 
that a state can penalize a defendant for continued silence. It means 
that the state can impose an appropriate sentence for the crime. In 
those cases where the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant's si-
lence, the state can still compel statements by granting immunity from 
their use. 
b. Fear of incrimination related to a separate criminal charge 
A more difficult Fifth Amendment problem is presented when a 
convicted criminal fears prosecution for a separate criminal charge. 
For example, in a probation revocation proceeding, a prosecutor 
might ask the defendant questions relating to a crime, such as bur-
glary, which she was suspected of committing while on probation. 
Her answers to the questions may result not only in the revocation of 
probation, but also in a separate criminal prosecution for burglary. 
However, a convicted defendant retains some Fifth Amendment pro-
tection. For example, in Minnesota v. Murphy, 56 the Court stated: 
A defendant does not lose [the] protection [of the Fifth Amend-
ment] by reason of his conviction of a crime; notwithstanding that a 
defendant is imprisoned or on probation at the time he makes in-
criminating statements, if those statements are compelled they are 
inadmissible in a subsequent trial for a crime other than that for 
which he has been convicted. 57 
53 Some sentences are stayed pending appeal, for example, death sentences. In other 
situations, however, the government's interest in protecting the public allows the state to 
incarcerate a defendant who is waiting to appeal. 
54 See, e.g., Delo v. Lashley, 113 S. Ct 1222, 1226 (1993) ("Once the defendant has 
been convicted fairly in the guilt phase of the trial, the presumption of innocence disap-
pears."). This is not to say that the government no longer has the burden to prove that the 
process was valid. Appeals which result in acquittal on a technicality are not proceedings 
to determine guilt or innocence. Although a defendant has to prove innocence after a 
verdict of guilty, the government still has the responsibility of showing that the verdict was 
obtained after a constitutionally valid trial. 
55 See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983) (observing that the Fifth 
Amendment "has never been thought to be in itself a substitute for evidence that would 
assist in meeting a burden of [proof]"). 
56 465 u.s. 420 (1984). 
57 !d. at 426. 
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Because a convicted criminal does not lose all claims to the protec-
tions of the Fifth Amendment, if a state wishes to elicit answers relat-
ing to separate criminal activity, it must provide immunity from 
subsequent prosecution. This is the clearest application of the Fifth 
Amendment in the postconviction context. 
In many cases, however, the inquiries are not this straightforward. 
For example, a court may impose general conditions of probation in-
stead of requiring answers to specific questions that relate to guilt. 
The purpose of these conditions is not to amass evidence for a later 
criminal prosecution, but to facilitate rehabilitation. Although such 
conditions may lead to future incrimination, they are not impermis-
sible.58 Requirements that a convicted criminal reveal financial infor-
mation,59 answer his probation officer truthfully,60 or successfully 
complete a therapy program 5 1 are examples of general probation con-
ditions that the courts have upheld as constitutional even though such 
conditions might reveal incriminating evidence.62 
2. Fear of Prosecutions for Perjury: Beyond the Scope of Immunity 
Statutes 
Immunity statutes provide "a reconciliation of the well-recog-
nized policies behind the privilege of self-incrimination ... , and the 
need of the State, as well as the Federal Government, to obtain infor-
mation 'to assure the effective functioning of government.' "63 They 
allow the government to compel a person to speak, but prevent the 
use of the statements in future prosecutions. Courts construe the im-
. munity broadly:64 it should "in all respects commensurate with the 
protection guaranteed by the constitutional limitation."65 In other 
words, statements which would have been excluded under the Fifth 
Amendment must also be excluded when elicited under a grant of 
immunity. 
One potential problem in this area involves prosecutions for per-
jury. Immunity statutes do not apply to prosecutions for perjury, the 
58 See discussion infra part IV. 
59 United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 
(1978). 
60 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984). See discussion infra part IV.B.l. 
61 State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, ll2 S. CL 1260, cert. dis-
missed, ll3 S. Ct. 444 ( 1992). See discussion infra part IV.B.2. 
62 This Note deals with these situations in more detail in part IV infra. 
63 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 81 (1973) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Murphy v. 
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93 (1964) (White,]., concurring)). 
64 See, e.g., Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960); Ullmann v. United States, 350 
U.S. 422 (1956), averruled by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
65 Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 141 (l9ll). See also New Jersey v. Portash, 
440 U.S. 450, 453 (1979) (holding that the immunity granted by state statutes "must be at 
least coextensive with the privilege afforded by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments"). 
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rationale being that the courts have an inherent power to punish false 
testimony. 5 6 This does, in fact, comport with the Constitution because 
the Fifth Amendment does not entitle a defendant to lie, but merely 
protects him if he chooses to remain silent. 57 If a defendant chooses 
to speak, "[t]he interests of the other party and regard for the function 
of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail 
in the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits of 
the privilege against self-incrimination."68 In United States v. Apfel-
baum,69 the Supreme Court noted that the federal immunity statute's 
express exception allowing prosecutions for perjury70 did not violate 
the Fifth Amendment.71 The Court interpreted the privilege as not 
protecting against proceedings to substantiate charges of perjury.72 
Moreover, the Court held that enhancing a sentence for willful per-
jury during trial does not violate the Fifth Amendment.73 The Court 
has stated that "a defendant who commits a crime and then perjures 
herself in an unlawful attempt to avoid responsibility is more threaten-
66 Glickstein, 222 U.S. at 141. 
67 See United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 {1969). Knox was charged with making false 
statements on his wagering registration form. The Court held that despite the fact that the 
Fifth Amendment would bar the use of truthful statements in the registration in a later 
criminal prosecution, ·it would not protect falsehoods. /d. at 82. 
68 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 
U.S. 148, 156 (1958)). 
69 445 u.s. 115 (1980). 
70 18 u.s.c. § 6002 (1988). 
71 Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. at 126. 
72 /d. See generally 70 CJ.S. Perjury§ 32 (1987) (discussing that there is no "right" to 
commit perjury). 
73 United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. llll (1993) (holding that the trial court may 
enhance sentence of a defendant convicted of a drug-related offense for willful pexjury 
that occurred when the defendant testified in her own defense). The Supreme Court em-
phasized that the district court must make specific findings to support all elements of a 
perjury violation. See id. at 1118. No standard, however, was articulated to determine the 
sufficiency of the evidence. It appears to be possible for the trial court to simply rest on 
the same evidence which was used to convict the defendant on the original charge. In 
other words a defendant who claims innocence under oath can be convicted of perjury 
simply on the basis that the verdict was guilty. Previous cases had held that the privilege 
mandates that a sentence cannot be augmented because of an unsubstantiated belief that a 
defendant committed perjury. See, e.g., Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d 393 (3rd Cir. 1975); 
Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
This approach appears to place more weight on the need of the criminal system to 
prevent false testimony than the individual's right to testify on his or her own behalf. Be-
cause a defendant convicted of another offense may have his sentence enhanced based on 
a claim of peijury simply because the final verdict in the case is guilty, defendants may be 
less likely to testify on the their own behalf. This is an example of balancing the Fifth 
Amendment protections against society's interest in an effective criminal system. See dis-
cussion infra parts III & IV. Although this Note focuses on the government's interest in 
rehabilitation, Dunnigan seems to allow other objectives of the criminal system, such as the 
need for truthful testimony, to take precedence over the protections afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment. 
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ing to society and less deserving of leniency than a defendant who 
does not so defy the trial process."74 
In summary, a defendant must establish the existence of a real 
fear of criminal incrimination for the first part of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege to apply. The adequacy of this fear may depend on 
whether the incrimination is related to the original criminal charge or 
to a different prosecution. When the government grants immunity, 
the fear is extinguished and the Fifth Amendment does not apply be-
cause statements made under the grant cannot be used against the 
person in a criminal prosecution. However, if a person previously has 
made statements under oath, subsequent inconsistent statements, 
even if made under a grant of immunity, can be used in a criminal 
prosecution for peijury. 
B. Exclusion of Coerced Testimony 
The second part of the privilege against self-incrimination pre-
vents the use of statements acquired through governmental compul-
sion. 75 The amendment's protections are not applicable to voluntary 
statements and are generally not self-executing-they must be as-
serted.76 There is no need for a knowing and intelligent waiver in 
most cases.77 In some situations, however, the mere failure to claim 
the privilege does not constitute a waiver. In these cases, special cir-
cumstances lead the courts to assume that compulsion is present and 
to allow defendants automatic immunity from the use of the state-
ments in later prosecutions. The following three sections discuss situ~ 
ations in which the Fifth Amendment protections are self-executing. 
1. Incrimination by Assertion of the Privilege 
When the claim of the privilege itself would result in incrimina-
tion, the courts treat the privilege as self-executing. In Hoffman v. 
United States,78 the Supreme Court held that "[t]o sustain the privilege, 
it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the 
setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or 
an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous be-
cause injurious disclosure could result."79 This situation is most evi-
dent in the context of federal income and excise taxation of gamblers. 
The mere act of refusing to file a tax return and claiming the privilege 
74 Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1118. 
75 See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 (1976). 
76 See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970) (holding that a person can lose 
the privilege simply by failing to claim it). 
77 See id. 
78 341 u.s. 479 (1951). 
79 !d. at 486-87. 
712 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:700 
incriminates the taxpayer. Consequently, the Court has held that 
merely failing to file triggers Fifth Amendment protections.80 
The privilege does not apply, however, when the government has 
a legitimate regulatory interest, unrelated to a criminal prosecution, 
in compelling information. For example, in California v. ByerS31 the 
Supreme Court determined that a California statute requiring all au-
tomobile drivers involved in an accident to stop and provide basic 
identifying information does not violate the Fifth Amendment. 82 The 
Court found that divulging one's name and address is not sufficiently 
incriminating to invoke the Fifth Amendment's protection.83 The 
Court also noted that the statute was regulatory, not criminal, in na-
ture and thus did not implicate the constitutional protection.84 The 
Court stated that "tension between the State's demand for disclosures 
and the protection of the right against self-incrimination . . . must be 
resolved in terms of balancing the public need . . . and the individual 
claim."85 
2. Custodial Interrogation 
The Fifth Amendment protections are also self-executing in cer-
tain cases of "custodial i11terrogation." For example, Miranda v. Ari-
zonaf36 established procedural safeguards for defendants who are 
questioned while in police custody. 87 The Supreme Court concluded 
that under the psychological pressures of interrogation during cus-
tody, suspects may provide statements they would otherwise have re-
fused to fumish. 88 Therefore, in such contexts, suspects must be told 
of their constitutional rights. Statements made in the absence of such 
80 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 
62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). SeegenerallyJoseph N. Laplante, 
Note, Self Incrimination on Incame Tax Returns: A Compelling Dilemma, 43 TAX LAw. 225 
(1989) (identifying difficulties with the current system). 
81 402 U.S. 424 (1971). 
82 See id. 
83 Jd. at 431. 
84 I d. at 430. This is an example of pre-indictment balancing. See discussion infra part 
III. 
85 Id. at 427. 
86 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A full analysis of Miranda, and the jurisprudence surrounding 
it, is beyond the scope of this Note. 
87 Prior to Miranda, the courts inquired as to whether a statement was voluntary or 
involuntary. See Yale Kamisar, A Dissent fram the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the 
"New" Fifth Amendment and the "Old" Voluntariness Test, 65 MicH. L. REv. 59 (1966) (asserting 
the ineffectiveness and unworkability of the old voluntariness test). See generally 2 LAFAVE & 
IsRAEL, supra note 31, at§ 6.2 (1992) (discussing the test for voluntariness). 
The Supreme Court set out the standard for voluntariness in Procunier v. Atchley, 400 
U.S. 446, 453 (1971). Although Miranda now covers many Fifth Amendment situations, 
the voluntariness standard is still applicable outside the custodial context. See, e.g., 
Withrow v. Williams 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
88 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-49. 
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warnings may not be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution.89 In-
vestigators must provide such warnings whenever a person's "freedom 
of action is curtailed in any significant way."90 Once outside the po-
lice setting, however, the parameters of the exception are unclear. 
Later cases have narrowed the holding in Miranda,91 and the Supreme 
Court has been reluctant to expand its scope into the probationary 
context.92 
3. The Penalty Situations 
The final situation in which a court will presume compulsion oc-
curs when a person is given a choice between either exercising the 
Fifth Amendment privilege and being penalized, or waiving the privi-
lege and incriminating himself. Not all sanctions are considered pen-
alties for Fifth Amendment purposes. The Supreme Court in Garrity 
v. New jersey93 held that civil sanctions are enough to trigger Fifth 
Amendment protection-the question is simply whether the defend-
ant has been deprived ofhis free choice to admit, deny or refuse to 
answer.94 In Lefkowitz v. Turley95 the Court stated that a "waiver se-
cured under threat of substantial economic sanction cannot be 
termed voluntary."96 The Supreme Court has also found the threat of 
loss of employment to be a penalty.97 
In Thomas v. United States,98 the Fifth Circuit held that increasing 
a defendant's sentence because he would not plead guilty is a penalty 
and violates the Constitution.99 Mter pronouncing a guilty verdict, 
the sentencing judge gave the defendant an ultimatum: he could con-
fess to the crime and possibly face a reduced sentence, or he could 
maintain his innocence and face the maximum sentence for bank rob-
bery.100 Thomas refused to confess and the court imposed the maxi-
89 See id. 
90 /d. at 467. 
91 See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984) (establishing the "public 
safety exception" to Miranda and noting that "overriding considerations of public safety 
[can]justuy [an] officer's failure to provide Miranda warnings"); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 
U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (defining interrogation as "express questioning or its functional 
equivalent"); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (allowing a defendant to waive his 
constitutional rights after only a partial warning). 
92 See discussion infra part N.B.l. 
93 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
94 See id. (finding application of Fifth Amendment rights in case in which police of-
ficers convicted of conspiracy were given the choice either to incriminate themselves or to 
forfeit their jobs). 
95 414 U.S. 70 (1973). 
96 !d. at 82-83. 
97 See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm 'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 ( 1968). 
98 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966). 
99 /d. at 946. 
100 /d. at 942. 
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mum sentence.101 In holding the district court's actions 
unconstitutional, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that "Thomas had not 
been finally and irrevocably adjudged guilty."102 Thus, if he con-
fessed, he would have been hurting his chances of success on appeal. 
The choice between either maintaining his innocence or receiving a 
lighter sentence violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. 
Ten years later, in United States v. Wright, 103 the same court reaffirmed 
this idea, stating that "[a] defendant does not lose his right to appeal 
or to continue to assert his innocence simply because the verdict of 
the jury is guilty."104 
The majority of other circuits follow the Thomas court's reason-
ing, holding that a threat to increase a defendant's sentence if he will 
not admit his guilt is unconstitutional. 105 The Ninth Circuit in Gol-
laher v. United States, 106 however, declined to follow the rationale of 
Thomas and applied a balancing test, 107 emphasizing the importance 
of rehabilitation over the defendant's right to maintain his innocence 
after conviction. 108 The court reasoned that when a criminal is unwill-
ing to take the first step toward rehabilitation-acceptance of respon-
sibility-the judge may impose a stricter sentence.l09 
Almost twenty years later, in United States v. Mourning, no the Fifth 
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guideline's 
two point reduction for "acceptance of responsibility."lll For each 
101 !d. 
102 !d. at 945. 
103 533 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1976). 
104 !d. at 216. 
105 See, e.g., United States v. Kovic, 830 F.2d 680, 691 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 1044 (1988); United States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382, 1404 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 1023 (1985); United States v. Roe, 670 F.2d 956, 973 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 856 (1982); United States v. DiRusso, 535 F.2d 673, 674 (1st Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836, 847 (2d Cir. 1968). 
106 419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969). 
107 See discussion infra part IV for a more detailed analysis of the application of a bal-
ancing test after conviction. 
108 See Gollaher, 419 F.2d at 530. 
109 !d. A defendant who admits guilt is a better candidate for rehabilitation than one 
who refuses to accept responsibility for his actions. See supra note 13 and accompanying 
text. 
110 914 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1990). 
111 !d. at 705-07 (discussing U.S. SENTENCING Cotvuvt'N GumEUNES MANuAL § 3El.l 
(1989) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. Although the circuits agree about the constitutionality of 
§ 3El.1, they do not agree as to its application. The First, Second and Ninth Circuits hold 
that a defendant need only accept responsibility as to the offenses charged. However, the 
Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits hold that the sentencing court has discretion to take 
into account all of the circumstances in determining the defendant's acceptance of respon-
sibility. See Kinder v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2290 (1992) (White,]. dissenting from denial 
of certiorari) (identifying the conflict between the circuits); United States v. Frierson, 945 
F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1515 (1992); United States v. O'Neil, 936 
F.2d 599 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Gordon 895 F.2d 932 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846 (1990); United States v. 
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crime, the guidelines provide for the calculation of a base. offense 
level.112 A court may then consider aggravating and mitigating factors 
and adjust the offense level accordingly.113 In practice there is no sub-
stantive difference between penalizing a defendant for maintaining 
his innocence by refusing to reduce his sentence and rewarding a de-
fendant who accepts responsibility by indirectly decreasing his prison 
term. 114 When trying to make a distinction, courts often focus on the 
purpose of sentencing, noting the difference between actions en-
gaged in for deterrent or rehabilitative purposes and those used as 
punitive measures. 115 If the purpose of sentencing is exclusively re-
tributive, there is no reason to lighten a criminal's sentence for ac-
cepting responsibility.I 16 If the purpose of sentencing is at least 
partially rehabilitative, however, courts should consider the criminal's 
acceptance of responsibility in determining the sentence. 117 
The emphasis in the postsentencing context should not be on the 
penalty-leniency distinction. The availability of the Fifth Amendment 
in a particular circumstance should depend instead upon the purpose 
of the action or inquiry that raised constitutional concerns. This 
should diminish the number of inconsistencies generated by the pen-
alty-leniency line and clarify the application of the privilege. When a 
court imposes an increased sentence as a punitive measure it is likely 
to violate the Fifth Amendment. In contrast, when the court's reasons 
for varying the length of incarceration are related to rehabilitative or 
o_ther legitimate goals of the criminal system besides punishment, the 
Mourning, 914 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 839 (1990); 
See also United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010 (11th Cir. 1989). 
112 See U.S.S.G. § 3El.l. 
113 See id. 
114 See john C. Coffee, Jr., "Twisting Slowly in the Wind": A Search for Constitutional Limits 
on Coercion of the Criminal Defendant, 1980 SuP. CT. REv. 211, 218 (questioning whether 
leniency can be distinguished from a penalty in the Fifth Amendment context). 
115 See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) (holding that a subsequent 
civil prosecution can violate the Double Jeopardy Clause when the proceedings are not 
designed to be remedial but seek to impose punitive sanctions instead); Allen v. Illinois, 
478 U.S. 364 (1986) (distinguishing between information gathered for therapeutic pur-
poses and that used for a criminal prosecution); Agustin v. Quem, 611 F.2d 206, 211 (7th 
Cir. 1979) (holding that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws only ap-
plies to the imposition of punishment, and because laws designed to protect the public are 
not punitive, they are not barred). The Fifth Amendment itself draws a distinction be-
tween civil and criminal prosecutions, the former being primarily restitutionary and the 
latter involving punitive measures. 
Section 3El.l 's purpose is to recognize "the increased potential for rehabilitation 
among those who feel and show true remorse." United States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488, 
1497 (D. Or. 1988), affd sub nom., United States v. Summers, 895 F.2d 615 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 959 (1990). 
116 See generally LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 3, at 25-27 (discussing theory of 
retribution). 
117 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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defendant's constitutional protections should be balanced against the 
government's interest. This model concedes that the sentencing dif-
ferences which result from a defendant's acceptance or denial of re-
sponsibility create coercive pressures. Yet such compulsion cannot be 
thought to always violate the Fifth Amendment, because a workable 
criminal system must be able to take into account a defendant's suita-
bility for rehabilitation. 
III 
BALANCING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN THE PRECONVICTION 
CoNTEXT 
This Part analyzes preconviction situations in which Fifth Amend-
ment concerns are implicated, but the courts have held that there is 
no violation of the privilege. By examining preconviction situations in 
which the courts have engaged in implicit balancing, this Note shows 
that the application of the Fifth Amendment is not absolute. This 
Note also argues that the courts should apply a balancing test which 
takes into account both society's interest in maintaining effective law 
enforcement and the individual's interest in applying the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. 
Although it did not list specific factors to be considered, the 
Supreme Court explicitly referred to the use of a balancing test in two 
Fifth Amendment cases. In Lefkowitz v. Turley118 the Court recognized 
the state's strong interest in questioning its employees, but noted that 
"claims of overriding interests are not unusual in Fifth Amendment 
litigation and they have not fared well." 119 Five years later in New jersey 
v. Portash, 12° the Court held that balancing was impermissible in cases 
in which testimony was given in response to a guarantee of immu-
nity.121 Despite these comments, the Court has not completely re-
futed the application of a balancing test. This Note argues that 
although the courts have not explicitly used a balancing test in con-
junction with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, they have done so implicitly.122 This section identifies cases in 
which courts have weighed the relevant concerns and allowed Fifth 
Amendment protections to yield to societal interests in effective law 
enforcement. 
118 414 u.s. 70 (1973). 
119 Id. at 78. 
120 440 u.s. 450 (1979). 
121 ld. at 459. The Court held that because the situation involved "the constitutional 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form," it was inappropri-
ate to consider the government's interest in using the compelled testimony. ld. 
122 See infra part III.B.4. 
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There are two situations where courts have balanced Fifth 
Amendment concerns in the presentencing, and even preconviction, 
context: in permitting the use of guilty pleas, and in determining the 
constitutionality of court-ordered therapy programs in cases involving 
the termination of parental rights. These situations demonstrate that 
the privilege against self-incrimination is not absolute. Even in the 
preconviction context, in which the defendant has a strong interest in 
avoiding self-incrimination, courts have been willing to balance the 
individual's interest against the public interest in maintaining an ef-
fective criminal justice system. The courts' willingness to balance in 
preconviction cases lends strong support for balancing in postconvic-
tion cases. 
A Guilty Pleas and Plea Bargaining 
In Brady v. United States, 123 the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of guilty pleas. Justice White, writing for the majority, 
stated, " [ w] e decline to hold ... that a guilty plea is compelled and 
invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the de-
fendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser pen-
alty."124 The Court reasoned that a defendant who chooses to go to 
trial does not face a greater sentence merely because he refused to 
plead guilty-he simply faces the punishment legally imposed for the 
crime of which he is found guilty. It is not unconstitutional for the 
state to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substan-
tial benefit to the government and who demonstrates by his plea that 
he is willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in 
a frame of mind that affords hope for successful rehabilitation in a 
shorter period than might otherwise be necessary.I25 
In coming to this conclusion, the Supreme Court, although it did 
not explicitly refer to the use of a balancing test, determined that cer-
tain interests outweighed the Fifth Amendment privilege prior to con-
viction. For example, the state's interest in facilitating rehabilitation 
and avoiding the expense of a full trial are sufficient to justify encour-
aging a guilty plea, despite the potential for unfair pressure on the 
defendant. Balancing such as this in the preconviction stage provides 
strong support for the use of a balancing test in the postconviction 
setting when a defendant has already been found guilty. 
123 397 u.s. 742 (1970). 
124 !d. at 751. 
125 !d. at 753. 
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B. Therapy as a Condition of Family Reunification 
Unlike defendants in the plea bargaining context, parents whose 
children are removed from their custody by the state usually have not 
been indicted on criminal charges. In many child abuse and neglect 
actions, courts order the parents to complete therapy programs. 
Regaining custody of the children is predicated upon successful com-
pletion of the program, during which the parents must accept respon-
sibility for their actions. 126 Because these civil custody cases may lead 
to future criminal prosecution, parents may fear the use in a criminal 
child abuse trial of statements they made during therapy. The state 
courts which have addressed this issue have reacted in different ways. 
1. The California Approach: Privileging Therapist-Patient 
Communications 
The first alternative, followed by Lh.e California Court of Appeals 
in In Re Eduardo A., 127 is to hold that therapist-patient communica-
tions are privileged and cannot be revealed in court. The court em-
phasized that psychological counseling is important to the 
determination of parental fitness. Consequently, the parents must 
feel free to speak honestly. Often the exact nature of the disclosures 
is unnecessary to the proper determination of custody. If this is the 
case, then the doctor need testify only to the overall fitness of the 
parents and need not relate specific facts revealed during counseling. 
Because the doctor does not relate any of the parents' statements to 
the court in such cases, there is no fear of incrimination and thus, the 
Fifth Amendment protections are unnecessary. 
Treating the therapist-patient relationship as privileged, however, 
does not necessarily avoid Fifth Amendment problems.128 The exact 
scope of the privilege is often unclear, because there may be many 
exceptions which operate in different circumstances. 129· Furthermore, 
the privilege only prevents the therapist from taking the stand and 
126 See generally William W. Patton, Note, The World VVhere Parallel Lines Converge: The 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 
GA. L. REv. 473, 510-23 (1990). 
127 261 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). This privilege is not thought to apply to 
communications with a therapist during a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation. The court 
in Eduardo distinguished between the two situations, citing the therapeutic purpose of the 
counseling programs as opposed to the inquisitive purpose of the psychiatric evaluations. 
Id. at 69-70. 
128 It is beyond the scope of this Note to analyze the application of privilege in the 
therapy context. 
129 See, e.g., People v. Cabral, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that 
when the defendant attempts to establish the existence of a therapeutic relationship, the 
scope of the privilege will be interpreted narrowly). See also State v. Rupp. 614 So.2d 1323 
(La. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that the therapist-patient privilege does not apply in child 
abuse prosecutions). 
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testifying about the specific nature of the communications with the 
patient. As evidenced by the holding in Tarasoff v. Regents of Califor-
nia, 130 a therapist may be required to reveal information gathered 
during counseling if the patient's statements indicate that he is likely 
to seriously injure a third party.131 Privileging the therapist-client rela-
tionship does not necessarily prevent the recipient of the therapist's 
information from testifying. Finally, if therapy is openly conditioned 
upon the patient's admission of guilt, the therapist's certification of 
the defendant's successful completion of the program may provide 
grounds for a peijury charge.132 Although this might not be enough 
in all situations to convict on a peijury charge, it could give rise to a 
reasonable fear of incrimination and thus trigger the protection of the 
Fifth Amendment. The chances of the government charging a 
defendant with peijury might not be overwhelmingly high, but the 
opportunity for such a prosecution exists, and must be taken into ac-
count in determining the availability of t.he Fift.h Punendment 
protections. 
2. The Minnesota Approach: No Coercion 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in In re S.A. V., 133 acknowledged 
the possibility of a subsequent criminal prosecution based on disclo-
sures made in court-ordered therapy programs, but held that requir-
ing a parent to cooperate with a psychological evaluation did not 
violate the Fifth Amendment because there was no compulsion. The 
court stated that "[t]ermination [of parental rights] in such a situation 
is not, however, a sanction for exercise of a constitutional right, but 
simply the necessary result of failure to rectify parental deficien-
cies."134 The court emphasized that the state had an interest in pro-
tecting the children and that the termination of parental rights is 
130 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
131 I d. It is it not unheard of for probation to be revoked as a result of incriminating 
information acquired during therapy. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, reh'g 
denied, 466 U.S. 945 (1984); see discussion infra part N.B.l. In a recent Arizona case, a 
probationer invited his probation officer to join him during his weekly sex-offender ther-
apy group. During the meeting he admitted to breaking into the homes of three women 
and stealing their underwear. The probation officer, acting on the new information, insti-
gated successful proceedings to revoke probation. News of the Weird, WASH. CnYPAPER, Oct. 
10, 1993, at 16. 
132 Although the exact nature of the communications would be privileged, the success-
ful completion of a therapy program which required the defendant to admit guilt would 
provide grounds for a peijury prosecution. The therapist could certify that the defendant 
completed the program, and that the completion was premised on the defendant's admis-
sion of guilt. 
133 392 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
134 Jd. at 264. This is analogous to the Rylander Court's statement about the burden of 
proof. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752. The Fifth Amendment silence cannot be used as a substi-
tute for proving parental fitness. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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merely a result of the parents' unsuitability. 135 In a later case, In re 
JW, 136 the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to force parents tore-
veal specific evidence which could implicate them in a separate crimi-
nal proceeding. 137 The court noted that the state could, however, 
compel the relevant testimony if it granted immunity. 13B This narrow 
holding did not overrule the lower court case, but simply restricted 
the court's ability to compel particular facts or explanations from the 
parents in such situations. 
Minnesota's approach, however, fails to evaluate appropriately 
the extent of the Fifth Amendment's protections. First, the threat of 
termination of parental rights is undoubtedly coercive. Furthermore, 
even if the court cannot compel the parents to answer a specific in-
quiry, the risk of incrimination still exists-successful therapy would 
require the parents to admit guilt and such evidence could be used to 
bring criminal charges of child abuse.l 39 In such a circumstance, both 
the real fear of incrimination and the presence of governmental coer-
cion implicate the Fifth Amendment. The better approach is to weigh 
the interests of the parents in avoiding incrimination against the 
state's interest in protecting children. This is the approach that the 
Vermont courts take to solve the problems which stem from the use of 
therapy as a condition of family reunification. 
3. The Vermont Approach: Balancing 
In State v. Mace, 140 the Vermont Supreme Court found that the 
requirement that a defendant participate in therapy, as directed by his 
therapist, was a condition "reasonably related to the rehabilitation of 
[the] defendant and thus lies within the discretion of the court."141 
The court acknowledged that the situation implicated Fifth Amend-
ment but balanced the interests involved and found that the protec-
tions did not apply in this case. Because the defendant pled guilty, 
the court concluded that there was no fear of forcing an innocent 
135 In re S.A. V., 392 N.W.2d at 264. 
136 415 N.W.2d 879 (Minn. 1987). 
137 I d. The trial court ordered the parents to explain the prior death of their nephew. 
In reversing, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the parents were threatened with the 
loss of their children and were penalized for exercising the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. See also In reJ.G.W, 433 N.W.2d 885, 886 (Minn. 1989) ("[l]t is a violation of the 
parent's fifth amendment privilege to directly require the parent to admit guilt as a part of 
a court-ordered treatment plan .... [However,] the privilege does not protect the parent 
from the consequences of any failure to succeed in a court-ordered treatment plan."). 
138 In reJ.W., 415 N.W.2d at 884. 
139 In this situation, the California approach might work. If the communications were 
privileged, they could not be offered in court; only the therapist's general determination 
of parental fitness would be admissible. The general certification would not be likely to 
provide grounds for a prosecution for child abuse. 
140 578 A.2d 104 (Vt. 1990). 
141 Id. at 107. 
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person to lie. Moreover, the program was designed to rehabilitate the 
defendant through recognition of his abusive behavior, rather than to 
subject him to further prosecution. Finally, the court reasoned that 
the defendant's fears of a separate sexual abuse charge arising out of 
acts discovered through therapy was not a realistic concern and thus 
did not justify Fifth Amendment protection.142 
The Mace court's analysis is flawed in one respect: although it 
may be unlikely that the state will use the evidence discovered in ther-
apy to institute separate criminal proceedings, this does not dissipate 
the fear of incrimination. Whether the state chooses not to initiate 
further criminal charges speaks to the possibility of prosecution and 
not to the possibility of incrimination. A parent's fear of incrimina-
tion is real and substantial, and therefore triggers the Fifth Amend-
ment protections. The government cannot override the privilege 
simply by later deciding not to prosecute after it has all the evidence. 
4. Interests of the Parties 
In custody cases and in the plea bargaining context, courts have 
applied a balancing test to determine the scope of the application of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege in a particular situation. The govern-
ment has a strong interest in protecting children. This interest, like 
the independent regulatory interest in gathering evidence in civil pro-
ceedings, is unrelated to procuring a criminal conviction.143 In Balti-
more City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight144 the Supreme Court 
noted that: 
VVhen a person assumes control over items that are the legitimate 
object of the government's noncriminal regulatory powers, the abil-
ity to invoke the [Fifth Amendment] privilege is reduced ... Once 
[a child is] adjudicated ... in need of assistance, his care and safety 
[become] the particular object of the State's regulatory interests.145 
142 !d. at 108. Additionally, in State v. Gleason, 576 A.2d 1246 (Vt. 1990), the Vermont 
Supreme Court held that conditioning probation on participation in counseling was not 
an abuse of discretion because the condition was reasonably related to the rehabilitation of 
the defendant. 
143 See discussion supra part II.B. I. 
144 493 U.S. 549 (1990). For commentaries on the case, see Irene M. Rosenberg, 
Bouknight: Of Abused Children and the Parental Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 76 IowA L. 
REv. 535 (1991) (asserting that when there is a hybrid (civil and criminal) purpose behind 
the production order, a court should balance the interests involved) and H. Bruce Dorsey, 
Note, Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight: The Required Records Doc-
trine-Logic and Beyond, 50 Mo. L. REv. 446 (1991) (advocating the use of a balancing test). 
145 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 558-59. The court held the defendant in contempt for fail-
ure to produce her child. It decided that the Fifth Amendment was not implicated be-
cause the state requested production of the child for reasons related to his well-being and 
not to gain information to be used in a criminal prosecution against the defendant. 
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Questioning parents about the abuse of their own children is rel-
evant to determining whether they are fit parents. The inquiry serves 
rehabilitative purposes, not punitive ones. Although information ob-
tained during questioning may result in termination of custody, or 
criminal prosecution, this is simply a logical consequence of the ad-
mission rather than an intended penalty. The applicability of the 
Fifth Amendment protection turns on the primary purpose for the 
proceeding. If the underlying purpose is to provide treatment or pro-
tection, rather than to impose punishment, then the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege is limited.146 This reasoning is similar to that used in 
the "independent regulatory scheme" exception discussed earlier.147 
If the court phrases the condition in such a way that the requirement 
is merely that the parents show their fitness or successfully complete 
therapy, it should be considered constitutional. 148 If parents are spe-
cifically required to incriminate themselves, such a requirement 
should violate the Fifth Amendment. When incrimination is merely a 
by-product of the requirement of showing fitness, the state's interest 
in protecting children may override the Fifth Amendment's protec-
tion against coercive pressures. These cases indicate a trend towards 
recognizing the importance of therapy as a tool for rehabilitation and 
the state's interest in promoting it. 
The conflict between the state's interest and the Fifth Amend-
ment in any of these cases can be avoided by granting immunity to the 
parents from the use of their incriminating statements.149 The 
defendant in Bouknight was held in contempt for failure to produce 
her child in response to a court order.150 If the state had simply 
granted immunity, the defendant could have produced the child with 
no fear of incrimination. The holding is evidence of the Court's will-
ingness to override Fifth Amendment protections, even when there 
are alternatives available. It also may be evidence of the weight that 
the Court accords to the government's interest in gathering evidence 
for child abuse prosecutions. 
In both the guilty plea and parental right termination cases, 
courts have imposed some limitations on the scope of the Fifth 
146 When the state's goal is rehabilitation, and not punishment, less weight should be 
placed on procedural safeguards. See Allen v. Illinois, 4 78 U.S. 364 ( 1986). Allen dealt with 
the issue of whether proceedings to declare a defendant a "sexually dangerous person" 
were criminal within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 365. Noting the rehabil-
itative purpose behind the proceedings, id. at 370, the Court held that such proceedings 
were essentially civil actions and that the process did not require application of the Fifth 
Amend~ent safeguards. ld. at 374-75. In so deciding, the Court weighed governmental 
and individual interests. See id. at 372-75. 
147 See discussion supra part II.B.l. 
148 See discussion supra part III.B.2. 
149 The immunity statutes would reach these situations. 
150 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 549. 
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Amendment by balancing the constitutional protections against the 
needs of the criminal justice system. Although these two preconvic-
tion situations may be unique, both are evidence that the privilege is 
not absolute. These situations also demonstrate the appropriateness 
of using a balancing test to determine the extent of the Fifth Amend-
ment protection against self-incrimination in the postconviction con-
text when the government's interest in rehabilitation is more 
pronounced. 
N 
BALANCING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN THE 
PosTSENTENCING CoNTEXT 
The Fifth Amendment is not absolute; the courts have weakened 
its prohibition on compelling a defendant to inculpate himself. For 
example, the absence of immunity for prosecutions for perjury shows 
that a state's interest in promoting truthfulness outweighs the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. Additionally, the legitimate regulatory interest 
exception allows the government to compel information when it has a 
strong public need. 151 The custodial interrogation exception has 
been limited to the police context. 152 Furthermore, the acceptability 
of guilty pleas recognizes that the need for official leniency when a 
defendant imparts a substantial benefit to the state outweighs an indi-
vidual's interest in avoiding coercive pressures. 
The Fifth Amendment privilege is not absolute prior to convic-
tion, and it should not be considered absolute after conviction. This 
Note proposes a two step analysis for Fifth Amendment questions, one 
which is similar to the two part due process test articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge. 153 First, a court should deter-
mine whether the Fifth Amendment is triggered, for example, 
whether there is a real fear of incrimination and governmental com-
pulsion. Second, if so, the court should determine whether a constitu-
tional violation occurred. In order to answer the second question in 
the postsentencing context, courts should apply a balancing test as the 
Supreme Court did in Matthews.I54 
151 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
152 See discussion supra part II.B.2. 
153 424 u.s. 319 (1976). 
154 !d. It is important to acknowledge that the text of the Fifth Amendment does not 
explicitly support this two step analysis. Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which has a built-
in reasonableness inquiry in that a court first determines whether there was a warrantless 
search or seizure and then applies a reasonableness test to determine whether the Amend-
ment has been violated, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is abso-
lute on its face. Ali noted above, however, application of the amendment's protections by 
the courts has not been absolute. As with the Fourth Amendment, a court must first de-
cide whether the Fifth Amendment protections apply. Second, the court should apply a 
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The balancing test proposed here recognizes the need for proce-
dural protections, yet it does not undermine the efficacy of rehabilita-
tive programs. This Note does not set out the exact weight to accord 
each consideration but merely defines the parameters that the courts 
should consider in interpreting a universal test. The following section 
first provides a background on probationary conditions and then dis-
cusses two cases which identify important factors to be considered in 
balancing. It then identifies the factors that should be balanced to 
determine the application of the Fifth Amendment in the post-
sentencing context. Finally, this section applies the test to two recent 
Supreme Court cases. 
A. Balancing Relevant Conditions of Probation and Fifth 
Amendment Protections 
The criminal justice system assumes that a verdict is correct and it 
does not provide a sentencing alternative for those who are wrongly 
convicted beyond the regular avenues of direct appeal and habeas 
corpus. Probation is not a means for wrongly convicted defendant's 
to escape jail, but is instead a form of punishment which is less severe 
than incarceration. It allows a state to avoid imprisoning defendants 
who do not present a threat to society. A person placed on probation, 
therefore, is presumed guilty. Although she retains certain constitu-
tional rights, her rights must be balanced against the requirements of 
an effective criminal justice system. 
1. The Federal Probation Act and the 1984 Sentencing Refonn Act 
The Federal Probation Act authorizes courts to impose probation 
or suspend a defendant's sentence for crimes committed before No-
vember 1, 1987.155 Conditions of probation must not be more strin-
gent than necessary for effective rehabilitation and protection of the 
public.156 Probation may be revoked at any time for the violation of a 
condition of probation, or for events which occurred before the pro-
bationary period started. 157 Thus, a perjury conviction resulting from 
false testimony given before the probation was effective would be 
balancing test to determine the extent of the constitutional protection-whether the indi-
vidual's interest outweighs the government's interest. 
155 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982) (repealed 1984, but effective for crimes committed before 
November 1, 1987). See generally Beth M. Elfrey, Project, Probation, Twentieth Annual Review 
of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1989-90, 79 CEO. L.J. 
1149 (1991) (discussing both the provisions and judicial treatment of the Act). 
156 Elfrey, supra note 155, at 1161. 
157 Id. at 1162. 
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grounds for terminating the probation and reinstating the 
sentence. 158 
The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act replaced the Federal Probation 
Act and is in effect for all crimes committed after November I, 
1987.159 The 1984 act differs from the Federal Probation Act in sev-
eral respects. First, the new act provides clear guidelines for imposing 
probation. 160 Second, the act allows courts to impose conditions of 
probation "reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the 
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the goals 
of sentencing."161 Additionally, a court may modify the conditions at 
any time during probation following a hearing.162 Like the Federal 
Probation Act, the Sentencing Reform Act allows a court to revoke 
probation for any violation during the probationary period, and per-
mits the court to reinstate the original sentence, impose a new sen-
tence or provide additional conditions of probation. 163 Although the 
act substantially clarifies the guidelines for imposing probationary 
conditions, it does not end the Fifth Amendment inquiry. The consti-
tutionality of certain conditions of probation and the permissibility of 
specific inquiries remain at issue. The next subsection sets out a test 
which analyzes the relationship between conditions of probation and 
the protections of the Fifth Amendment. 
2. Balancing Considerations: Legitimate Goals and Relevant 
Inquiries 
In United States v. Pierce, 164 the Ninth Circuit held that a condition 
of probation requiring a defendant to reveal financial information 
does not violate the Fifth Amendment. 165 In determining that the 
condition promoted the rehabilitative goals of the Federal Probation 
Act, the court relied on a test articulated in United States v. Consuelo-
Gonzalez.166 In Consuelo-Gonzalez the Ninth Circuit held that a proba-
tioner is not considered to have voluntarily waived his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege with regard to specific probation conditions merely 
158 See, e.g., United States v. Stehl, 665 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1981) (probation revocation 
proceeding followed peijury conviction). 
159 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3674, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988). See 
generally Elfrey, supra note 155, at 1149-59 (discussing both the provisions and judicial treat-
ment of the 1984 act); Wendy R. Willis, Project, Probation, Twenty-second Annual Review of 
Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, GEO. LJ. 1491, 1496 
(1993). 
160 Elfrey, supra note 155, at 1149. 
161 Willis, supra note 159, at 1493. 
162 Jd. at 1494. 
163 Jd. at 1495-96. Probation revocation proceedings are governed by rules of criminal 
procedure. FED. R. CruM. P. 32.1. 
164 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978). 
165 Jd. 
166 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane). 
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because he failed either to assert the right, or to object at the sentenc-
ing.167 The Pierce court noted that "[a]s a practical matter, a defend-
ant's consent to a probation condition is likely to be nominal where 
consent is given only to avoid imprisonment."I6s However, this does 
not end the inquiry. Although Fifth Amendment claims may not be 
extinguished with regard to a specific probationary condition, this 
does not mean that the privilege applies to all situations. The Pierce 
court applied the Consuelo-Gonzalez balancing test to establish whether 
the condition was justified by the needs of rehabilitation. 169 
The Consuelo-Gonzalez test examines three elements in determin-
ing whether a condition is reasonably related to the purposes of 
probation: 
( 1) the purposes sought to be sel\fed by probation; 
(2) the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law-abid-
ing citizens should be accorded to probationers; 
(3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement.170 
These factors balance the rehabilitative interest of imposing probation 
and the constitutional protection of the Fifth Amendment. This ap-
proach has had considerable influence. Several courts have adopted 
this balancing approach,171 and the Sentencing Reform Act codified 
its elements, thereby permitting courts to balance the relevant inter-
ests when setting conditions of probation. 172 
In Asherman v. Meachum173 the Second Circuit used a balancing 
analysis to determine that the revocation of a prisoner's home release 
status for failure to answer relevant questions did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment. The court noted that "public agencies retain the au-
thority to ask questions relevant to their public responsibilities and to 
take adverse action against those whose refusal to answer impedes the 
discharge of those responsibilities."174 The Second Circuit also noted 
167 !d. at 265. 
168 Pierce, 561 F.2d at 739 (citing Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 274 (Wright, J., 
dissenting)). 
169 !d., at 739-40. 
170 Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 262. 
171 See, e.g., United States v. Stine, 646 F.2d 839, 842-43 (3d Cir. 1981) (upholding the 
revocation of probation for a defendant who violated a condition requiring psychological 
treatment and implicitly accepting the Consuelo-Gonzalez balancing test); United States v. 
Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Consuelo-Gonzalez and holding that a 
condition of probation must be "reasonably related to rehabilitation of the probationer, 
protection of the pubic against other offenses during its term, deterrence of future miscon-
duct by the probationer or general deterrence of others, condign punishment, or some 
combination of these objectives"); cf Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330,333 (lOth Cir. 1971) 
(holding in a case predating Consuelo-Gonzalez that conditions of probation must have "a 
reasonable relationship to the treatment of the accused and the protection of the public"). 
172 See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying notes. 
173 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (en bane). 
174 !d. at 982. 
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that Asherman was penalized not for the exercise of his constitutional 
rights, but for "failure to answer a relevant inquiry."175 Asherman's 
parole was revoked due to his failure to abide by the condition requir-
ing a psychiatric examination, not simply due to his silence. Because 
the state needed to conduct a psychiatric examination to establish the 
defendant's fitness for parole, Asherman's failure to respond to ques-
tions resulted in the need to employ alternative options. Because pa-
role was not a viable alternative, the state had no other option than to 
revoke Asherman's home release and to incarcerate him. 
The distinction between the consequences that follow the failure 
to answer a relevant inquiry and punishment for the assertion of Fifth 
Amendment rights forces courts to balance the needs of the criminal 
justice system against the constitutional protections. It is impermis-
sible for a court to increase a criminal's sentence or to revoke proba-
tion merely because the defendant invokes the Fifth Amendment.176 
If, however, the criminal refuses to answer a relevant inquiry177 that is 
rationally related to the goals of incarceration or probation, then the 
defendant's interest in remaining silent should be balanced against 
the interests of the state and the requirements of the criminal system. 
When the balance tilts in favor of the government, making the 
defendant choose (between waiving the privilege and thus receiving 
certain benefits, such as probation instead of incarceration, or assert-
ing the privilege and facing the consequences he would have had to 
face had probation not been available in the first place) is not uncon-
stitutionaJ.l78 In such cases, the failure to assert the privilege should 
be deemed a voluntary waiver. 
In any case a court should first determine whether the Fifth 
Amendment applies at all. The court may then determine the extent 
of the Fifth Amendment protection. In the postconviction context, a 
court should consider the following: the legitimacy of the govern-
ment's purpose, with effectuating rehabilitation being a more legiti-
175 Jd. at 983. The court emphasized that the questioner did not express interest in 
using the statements in a later criminal proceeding. Id. The court appeared to draw a 
distinction based on the focus of the proceeding. Here, the commissioner was not trying to 
amass evidence for a later criminal proceeding; instead he was attempting to ascertain the 
appropriateness of Asherman's home release status. 
176 Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 ( 1968). 
177 The protections of the Fifth Amendment do not fail before every relevant inquiry. 
For example, when a police officer asks a suspect specific questions about a crime, that 
inquiry is relevant to the government's interest in maintaining law and order. The Fifth 
Amendment, however, applies in full force. A court must consider the purpose behind the 
inquiry. Gathering evidence for a criminal trial is not a legitimate goal permitting compul-
sion under the Fifth Amendment. See supra part II.A. Alternatively, compelling answers to 
facilitate rehabilitation is a legitimate goal. Id. Even so, the court must balance the inter-
ests involved and the defendant must be allowed the choice of whether to answer or not. 
178 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971) ("[T)he Constitution does not 
... always forbid requiring [a defendant] to choose."). 
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mate goal than coercing a confession; the relevance of the condition 
to a legitimate goal of the state; and the individual's interest in the 
protection, which depends on the probability that the government 
will bring a subsequent prosecution based on the incriminating state-
ments. None of these considerations is determinative; each situation 
should be evaluated on its own facts. Nor should this list be consid-
ered exhaustive. Additional considerations may include whether 
there are viable alternatives to the particular rehabilitation program 
or whether the state can grant immunity. This flexible approach 
should avoid the need for narrow exceptions to the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. Instead, courts should decide 
cases on an individual basis, taking into account many different fac-
tors, not least of which is the importance of rehabilitative programs. 
B. Application of the Balancing Test 
The following subsections apply the proposed balancing test to 
two recent Supreme Court cases. In each case, the lower court had 
imposed a general condition of probation that conflicted with the 
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Because in 
both cases the conditions were relevant to the rehabilitation of the 
convicted criminal and were necessary to achieve goals of the criminal 
justice system, the interests of both the state and the defendants 
should be weighed. Consequently, in both cases this Note concludes 
that interests of the state outweigh those of the defendants. 
1. Condition of Truth-Minnesota v. Murphy 
In Minnesota v. Murphy, 179 the defendant claimed that a condition 
of probation requiring him to speak truthfully to his probation officer 
violated the Fifth Amendment. Mter pleading guilty to a sex offense, 
Murphy was given a suspended sentence and placed on probation. 180 
During the course of court-ordered therapy, the probationer told his 
therapist about a previous rape and murder he had committed. The 
therapist contacted Murphy's probation officer, who arranged a meet-
ing with Murphy and questioned him about the incident. 181 Murphy 
voluntarily admitted the crime. The probation officer related the in-
179 465 U.S. 420 (1984). SeegenerallyShelbyWebb,Jr., Note, Constitutional Law-Warn-
ing to Probationers: Admissions Made to Your Probation Officer Without Prior Warning Can Be Used 
Against You in a Subsequent Criminal Proceeding-Minnesota v. Murphy, 28 How. LJ. 355 
(1985) (arguing that Murphy substantially clarifies the contours of a probationer's constitu~ 
tiona! rights). 
180 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 422. 
181 ld. at 423 n.l. This is a good example of a situation in which privileging the com-
munications between the therapist and the client did not work. Although the therapist 
could not testifY in court about his knowledge, he was not barred from informing the 
probation officer. See discussion supra part III. B. I. 
1994] NOTE-COURT-ORDERED THERAPY 729 
criminating information to the police, who issued a warrant for Mur-
phy's arrest. 182 As mentioned earlier,183 a probation revocation 
proceeding is not considered a criminal prosecution; thus, any state-
ments made by a probationer can be used to demonstrate a violation 
of a condition of probation.184 The state used Murphy's statements, 
however, not only to revoke his probation, but also to prosecute him 
subsequent to the revocation proceeding.1B5 
The Court found that Murphy had voluntarily waived his Fifth 
Amendment protection and that he had been under no compulsion 
to speak. 186 Additionally, the Court failed to find any of the excep-
tions which grant automatic immunity: Murphy would not have in-
criminated himselfby simply claiming the right; 187 a conversation with 
a probation officer under these circumstances is not considered a cus-
todial interrogation;188 and he had not been threatened with a pen-
alty for remaining silent.189 The Court emphasized, however, that "if 
the State, either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of 
the privilege would lead to revocation of the probation, it would have 
created the classic penalty situation."19° 
The majority dismissed Murphy's claim that the confidence in-
spired by the probation officer and that Murphy's possible fear of rev-
ocation of his probation led him to volunteer information he would 
not have offered had he been apprised of his rights.191 Dissenting, 
Justice Marshall argued that the state presented Murphy with the 
"Hobson's choice, of incriminating himself or suffering a penalty."192 
Because the threat to revoke probation was coercive and no Miranda 
warnings were given, Justice Marshall would have automatically immu-
nized Murphy's statements from use in a future prosecution.193 
The application of a balancing test would avoid this conflict be-
tween the majority and dissent by acknowledging that the Fifth 
Amendment protections are triggered but weighing their application 
182 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 423-24. 
183 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
184 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). 
185 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 425. 
186 Jd. at 429. 
187 Jd. at 439-40. 
188 Jd. at 431. 
189 Jd. at 439. 
190 Jd. at 435. In a footnote clarifying this statement, the Court noted that the Fifth 
Amendment would not apply if compliance with the condition would not pose a realistic 
threat of incrimination-if, for example, the condition were merely a residential restric-
tion, or a limitation on travel. Furthermore, in dicta, the Court noted that a state could 
compel a probationer to answer even incriminating questions as long as it provided immu-
nity from future criminal prosecution. /d. at 437 n.7. 
191 Jd. at 431-33. 
192 Id. at 443 (Marshall,]., dissenting). 
193 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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against the state's interest in effective probation. The threat of proba-
tion revocation may influence a defendant's willingness to offer infor-
mation. However, because the requirement of truthfulness was a 
legitimate condition of Murphy's probation and was not designed to 
present him with an unconstitutional choice, Murphy was not entitled 
to automatic immunity. 
Both the majority and dissent emphasized the distinction be-
tween questions pertaining to the original prosecution and questions 
about a different crime. 194 As to the former, the Fifth Amendment 
right to remain silent is extinguished after a final conviction. 195 The 
protections remain available, however, in the latter inquiries. 196 The 
condition involved here was a general one which merely required 
Murphy to be truthful to his probation officer; it did not require him 
to disclose specific incriminating incidents. Such conditions are rele-
vant to the government's interest in promoting successful probation 
and rehabilitation. The probationary relationship, like the therapeu-
tic relationship, is premised on trust. In order for the probation of-
ficer to be as effective as possible, the defendant must be truthfuL 
This does not mean that the defendant cannot remain silent; but if he 
speaks he must not lie. Murphy, for example, could have remained 
silent without violating his probation. Ultimately, the state's interest 
in promoting truthfulness outweighed the defendant's interest in 
avoiding coercive pressures.197 Therefore, Murphy's failure to assert 
the privilege was appropriately considered a voluntary waiver. 
2. Condition of Successful Completion of Therapy-State v. Imlay198 
Imlay, like Murphy, stood trial and was found guilty. Unlike Mur-
phy, however, Imlay asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege during 
therapy and claimed that he was penalized for his silence. During the 
trial he voluntarily testified and maintained his innocence. 199 There-
fore, the requirement that Imlay admit guilt as part of a therapy pro-
gram presented a real fear that he might face criminal prosecution for 
perjury. As noted earlier, there is no protection for perjured state-
194 ld. at 426, 441 (Marshall,]., dissenting). 
l 95 See discussion supra part II.A.l. 
196 See discussion supra part II.A.l. 
197 This is consistent with the failure of the immunity statutes to cover prosecutions for 
perjury. The constitutional protection is not interpreted to allow false testimony. See dis-
cussion supra part II.A. 
198 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 
444 (1992). 
199 Id. at 985. 
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ments.200 Therefore, in contrast to the parental reunification cases,201 
the state could not have immunized Imlay's statements in order to 
compel answers. 202 Because there is no protection for false state-
ments, if Imlay were forced to admit guilt he could be charged with 
peijuring himself in the earlier proceeding. 
Even when there is a real fear of incrimination, the Fifth Amend-
ment is not available absent governmental compulsion.203 Here, as in 
the plea bargaining situation, the defendant faces a choice. The Con-
stitution "does not forbid 'every government-imposed choice in the 
criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of 
constitutional rights.' "204 Montana did not force Imlay to admit his 
guilt; it merely provided him with a means of rehabilitation which he 
could have chosen not to accept.205 As one state court noted, "[e]ven 
if the requirement of admission of guilt ... impinged on Fifth Amend-
ment rights, the inmate is not compelled to incriminate himself be-
cause the inmate may choose not to participate in t..h.e program."206 
Additionally, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes207 the Supreme Court, examin-
ing plea bargains, stated that "there is no such element of punishment 
or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject [an offer 
ofadifferentsentence]."208 The state's goal is not to force those inno-
cent of the crimes for which they have been convicted to peijure 
themselves during therapy. Instead, the intention of the state is to 
help guilty criminals accept responsibility for their actions and also to 
prevent recidivism. The choice between probation and incarceration 
involves governmental compulsion; few would choose confinement in 
200 See discussion supra part II.A. But cf. Scott M. Solkoff, Note, Judicial Use Immunity 
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17 NovA L. 
REv. 1441 (1993) (advocating the application of judicial use immunity in the Imlay 
context). 
201 See discussion supra part III.B. 
202 Immunity is only effective if the defendant is protected from all later criminal pros-
ecutions stemming from the compelled testimony. 
203 See discussion supra part II.B. 
204 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236 (1980) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 
412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973) ). jenkins recognized the importance of considering the legitimacy 
of the challenged governmental practice in determining whether a constitutional right has 
been impermissibly burdened. Id. at 238. 
205 The goal in this situation is to help the defendant, rather than to amass evidence 
for another criminal prosecution. In Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), the Court dis-
tinguished between statutes that aim to provide treatment and those that aim to define 
criminal activities. The former are civil in nature and thus do not invoke the protections of 
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 375. In such a situation, the purpose of eliciting the defend-
ant's admission of guilt is to provide treatment, not to label him a criminal or to prosecute 
him for peijury. 
206 Henderson v. State, 543 So.2d 344, 346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that 
conditioning the early release of a sex offender upon his satisfactory participation in a 
therapy program did not violate the Fifth Amendment). 
207 434 u.s. 357 (1978). 
208 Id. at 363. 
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a cell over the relative freedom offered by probation. Such compul-
sion, however, does not always rise to the level of constitutional infir-
mity. Rather than asserting that the Fifth Amendment is not triggered 
in these situations, it is more accurate to admit the presence of the 
evils against which the constitutional privilege seeks to protect. The 
analysis should not end there, however. Once a court establishes that 
the Fifth Amendment is triggered, it should then ask whether it is 
appropriate to apply its protections. The court should do this by bal-
ancing the interests of the criminal against those of the state. 
The state has a strong interest in rehabilitating criminals through 
therapy and probation. First, the purpose of therapy is to provide 
treatment, not to punish; its use stems from society's interest in reha-
bilitation. The therapist is not a law enforcement officer and has no 
power to detain a patient who is unwilling to participate. Therapists 
strive to create a supportive environment in which people can feel 
comfortable talking about their problems. Under no circumstances 
would a competent therapist threaten a patient. Second, acceptance 
of responsibility is a necessary condition of therapy. 209 Third, rehabil-
itation is a legitimate goal of law enforcement210 and this goal re-
quires effective therapy programs. As the American Professional 
Society on the Abuse of Children noted in its amicus brief in Imlay: 
Effective treatment depends on cooperation between treatment 
professionals and the criminal justice system, particularly courts and 
probation and parole officials. The courts play a critical role by 
mandating participation in treatment as a condition of probation or 
parole. Court-ordered treatment provides an important external 
motivator for offenders to enter and remain in treatment.211 
Finally, it is unlikely that the government will prosecute the proba-
tioner for perjury based on incriminating statements made during 
therapy.212 
209 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
210 United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978). Although this Note focuses on 
the rehabilitative goals of the criminal justice system, there are other interests that may 
conflict with the Fifth Amendment's protections. This Note does not intend to suggest 
that all such considerations should trump the privilege. It is important, however, to recog-
nize some of the cases which have focused on other goals. See, e.g., McGuatha, 402 U.S. at 
217 (per curiam) (holding that the privilege was not violated by the state requirement that 
a jury determine guilt and punishment in the same proceeding and stating that the poli-
cies behind the amendment were "not offended when a defendant in a capital case yields 
to the pressure to testify on the issue of punishment at the risk of damaging his case on 
guilt"); United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993) (holding that the government's 
interest in appropriate punishment permits a court to increase a defendant's sentence 
when he or she commits willful peijury during the trial). 
211 APSAC Brief, supra note 2, at 8-9. 
212 Peijury charges are generally difficult to prove, and thus the government does not 
often choose to expend its limited resources on such prosecutions. In the therapy context, 
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The state's interests in fostering individual responsibility and re-
habilitation outweigh Imlay's interest in avoiding self-incrimination. 
The requirement of therapy programs that a person accept responsi-
bility is indispensable to their rehabilitative goal. Additionally, a per-
son in Imlay's situation may still choose whether or not to comply with 
the condition of probation. Although he may still appeal his verdict, 
he may not use the Fifth Amendment to shield him from the punish-
ment legally imposed for his crime. He may, in effect, choose his pun-
ishment, whether it be probation and therapy or incarceration. 
Because a probationer's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination is not violated even if his probation is revoked, the bal-
ance favors allowing the condition. 
CoNCLUSION 
There is no consensus on the application of the Fifth Amend-
ment protections in postsentencing situations. Montana v. Imlay pro-
vided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the operation 
of the privilege in this context. For procedural reasons, the Court 
chose not to take advantage of the opportunity.213 The implications 
of the Montana Supreme Court opinion, holding that the court-or-
dered sex-offender program violated the Fifth Amendment, may be 
profound. If therapy programs are no longer used for fear of imping-
ing on criminals' Fifth Amendment rights, the use of rehabilitative 
sentencing alternatives, such as probation, will likely decline. 
As prison populations increase, we need realistic and appropriate 
alternatives to incarceration. Rehabilitat,i_on through probation and 
therapy offers a sound alternative. Therapy programs are a traditional 
form of psychological treatment and generally are not unusually intru-
sive. Furthermore, concerns that therapy is ineffective in the correc-
tional setting because of the inherently coercive atmosphere214 are 
less forceful in the probationary context. It therefore becomes impor-
tant to retain such programs as part of the probation scheme, lest 
rehabilitative operations disappear entirely from the criminal system. 
Therapy is an ideal rehabilitation-focused alternative. If courts cannot 
impose reasonable conditions to ensure compliance with therapy pro-
grams, however, this alternative may well disappear. 
The procedural safeguards of the Fifth Amendment recognize 
the criminal system's fallibility. Although the emphasis on perfecting 
the means of separating the guilty from the innocent is justifiable, it 
should not undermine procedures used to achieve other goals of the 
the state is likely to be more concerned with rehabilitating the offender than with ob-
taining another conviction. 
213 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
214 See, e.g., Veneziano, supra note 10, at 141. 
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system such as punishment and rehabilitation. The protections must 
be balanced against the overall objective of the criminal legal sys-
tem-to insure the safety of our society by providing a means for both 
punishment and rehabilitation. Therapy programs, which force an of-
fender to accept responsibility for his actions and work toward avoid-
ing recidivism, provide one of the best means to effectuate this latter 
goal. 
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